



Terrorism Phenomenon in Indonesia: Study of Theological Aspects, Ideology and Movement

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Abstract Terrorism is a theme that invites the attention of many in the academics to examine the main aspects of ideology, theology, networks and movements. At this time, terrorism has become a global phenomenon. Terrorism has penetrated almost every country in the world, including Indonesia. As in other areas, terrorism in Indonesia also has the basics of theology and ideology and networks so that it has a strong resistance. Until recently, terrorism became one of the challenges and threats to national security. This article is to examine the development of terrorism in Indonesia, which focuses on aspects of theology, ideology and movement.

Keywords : Terrorism, Theology, Ideology

1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a very unique and interesting theme to research and study. Terrorism, as a term for a social phenomenon, is always in ongoing debate and never ends. Terrorism as an object of research has produced many scientific works and produced in-depth studies. Among researchers, there are many who raise the themes of terrorism and create various new theories. This indicates that terrorism is a theme that has very high appeal and is a theme that will never dry up. All of this proves that researchers' concern for terrorism themes is still quite high. And likewise, the very varied results of research on terrorism indicate that there are still interesting aspects that still need to be studied further. This background encourages the author to study terrorism further from a socio-historical perspective. This paper wants to understand the background to the emergence of terrorism seen from a socio-historical perspective, what is the perspective of sociological theory, both micro and macro, what is the dialectic between these various theories.

Formulation Of The Problem :

1. What is the ideology and movement of terrorism in Indonesia?
2. The factors behind Indonesia becoming a fertile land or "paradise", as a source of recruitment for terrorist groups?

2. DISCUSSION

Ideology and Terrorist Movements in Indonesia

The term terrorism is still relatively "new", especially in Indonesia. According to Kacung Marijan, the word terror is mentioned with the terms *system*, *regime de terreur* that time first appeared in 1789 in *The Dictionnaire of The Academic Francaise* (Marijan, 2003). The context of the French revolution is inherent in the use of the term. Therefore, the term terrorism at that time had a positive connotation, namely actions carried out to overthrow a despotic ruler and these actions were carried out successfully. However, terrorist practices have been around for a long time since around 66 - 67 BC, when extreme Jewish groups carried out acts of terror, including murder, against the Romans who were occupying their territory (roughly the area disputed by Israel and Palestine Now). Since then, acts of terrorism in various parts of the world, involving various ethnicities and religions, have continued to occur.

Meanwhile, according to Jainuri (2006), the terms terror and terrorism have become very popular social science idioms in the 1990s and early 2000s as a form of religious violence. Although terrorism is actually not a new term. Acts of terror have appeared throughout human history. How Adam's son, Qabil terrorized Habil, because he was considered to be an obstacle to Qabil's desires. Some forms of terror have become common ways to intimidate opponents. People who believe that violence can intimidate enemies or opponents into fear. As a label for violent acts, this term reflects a negative meaning for those who are labeled terrorists. In this sense, terrorist is equated with other hurtful terms in political language, such as racist, fascist or imperialist.

Terrorism is one of the many terms and concepts in social science that is full of controversy and debate. This cannot be separated from the fact that efforts to define - terrorism cannot be separated from various interests, including ideological and political interests. So controversial, Laqueur (1987) even argued that a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist or will not be found in the future. In fact, defining terrorism is quite important, not only for academic purposes, but also for practical purposes, namely how to overcome it. Fighting organized terrorism, for example, must have clarity as to whether the organization being fought is considered a terrorist or not. Such clarity must of course come from a clear definition as well. Without clarity, efforts to combat this could have a counterproductive impact. As a linguistic term, terrorism should be understood with great care, rather than being an instrument of propaganda. Therefore, it

is important to provide a clear definition of terrorism. With the clarity of this definition, people will understand the true meaning of the term terrorism, and then design appropriate punishments for the perpetrators of terror.

In Gibbs' view, quoted by Asfar (2003), the emergence of controversy regarding the definition of terrorism cannot be separated from the fact that labeling acts of terrorism will stimulate strong criticism of the perpetrators. Therefore, efforts to define it will not be free from political or ideological bias. Meanwhile, in Wardlaw's (1989) view, efforts to define terrorism cannot be separated from moral issues. This moral problem is related to the reality that in defining terrorism it cannot be separated from an assessment that there are violent incidents which is justified on the one hand, and there are incidents of unjustified violence on the other hand. Therefore, efforts to define terrorism are not free from controversy.

Some time after the bombings in two twin buildings in New York, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Among the important topics that have become hotly debated is the issue of terrorism. Even though the OIC are Islamic countries, which means there is a common thread that binds them, the OIC fails to define terrorism. Apart from the fact that this definition cannot be separated from the biases of political interests and ideology, some participants refused to carry out the definition because this problem has become a big problem for the international community, not just a problem for the OIC. Apart from that, this reluctance cannot be separated from the fact that the acts of terrorism that have emerged in recent years involve Muslims. The Palestinian Foreign Minister defended himself: "We reject all attempts to link terrorism with the struggle of the Palestinian people to obtain their rights to establish an independent state. We reject all attempts to link Islamic countries, Palestinian resistance and Lebanon with terrorism." For him, "terrorism number one and the worst" is "state terrorism" carried out by Israel. Of course, Israel also refuses to say it is part of state terrorism.

If viewed from an etymology perspective, terrorism is rooted in the word terror meaning fear, anxiety; terrorism means terrorism, deterrence; terrorist means terrorist, troublemaker; terrorize (vb) means to frighten (Wojowasito & Poerwadarminta, 1980). According to Chomsky (www.serenipity.nofadz.com), the concept of terrorism is still unclear and in general people differ on the definition of terrorism. The term terrorism refers more to tactics, tools to achieve certain goals. As a tactic, terrorism can always be

used at any time for action for a group. If terrorism is understood as a tactic, then it would be very wrong to declare a “war on terrorism,” because one cannot defeat tactics. The declaration of war on terrorism is the same as constantly declaring war (in fact, this is the real intention).

However, to give an idea of how terrorism is defined, there are four groups that have different views on terrorism, namely academics, government, the general public, and terrorists and their sympathizers. In general, academics prioritize intellectualism and are neutral in conducting research on anything related to terrorism. Academic culture, such as curiosity, skepticism, and a set of methodologies will be able to bring about a more independent and non-partisan attitude and discovery of meaning compared to other groups. The definition of terrorism from this group emerged in 1988, which states that terrorism is a method that is motivated by the desire to carry out repeated acts of violence, carried out by individuals, groups, or clandestine authorities, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons. Therefore, in contrast to assassination, which directly executes the target of murder, the direct target of terror violence is not the person who is the main target. Victims of violence are usually chosen randomly (*targets of opportunity*) or selected (*representative* or *symbolic targets*) from the community which becomes the target, which is then used as the source of the message. Threats and violence-based communication processes between terrorists and victims are used to manipulate the real main targets. This last target becomes the target of terror, the target of prosecution, or the target of attention, depending on the level of intimidation, coercion, and propaganda desired (Schmid, 1999).

The definition used by those in power tends to interpret the term terrorism in a more extreme way, because they are actively obliged to eradicate terrorist activities, and even become victims of terrorism. The British government was the first to formulate an official definition distinguishing between terrorist and criminal acts. In 1974, the definition explained that “terrorism is the use of violence for political purposes, and includes the use of violence to put society in fear.” In 1980, the CIA (*Central Intelligence Agency*) defined terrorism as “the threat or use of violence for political purposes carried out by individuals or groups, in the name of or against a legitimate government, to terrify society broader than the terrorist's direct victims.” ” (www.twf.org).

Those involved in terrorism have a different view from other observers. While at the end of the 19th century many bomb throwers from Russian anarchists and socialists

did not feel discouraged by being labeled terrorists, this is not the case with contemporary terrorists. The latter are aware of the stigma of being called a terrorist and therefore try to avoid the label of terrorist. When a conference on terrorism was held in Leiden in 1989, a group calling itself *the Revolutionary Commando Marinus van de Lubbe* , sent a letter to a local newspaper expressing its sympathy for the people they claimed were oppressed, such as: Palestine, Ireland, Central America, and Kurdistan. They said: "it is clear that what is called terrorism is actually a logical and just resistance of the people against government terrorism, capitalism, racism and imperialism."

Terrorists often fight back to obtain moral justification by comparing the violence they commit with the violence committed by their opponents. With this kind of comparison, terrorists try to position their actions and goals on the same moral level as those of the governments they oppose. In World War II, the German occupation army labeled all resistance groups as "terrorists." Likewise the colonialists towards the colonial people. The latter, on the other hand, saw themselves as patriots fighting for independence. The Israeli government now views the Palestinian fighters as a people terrorists , on the other hand, the Palestinian people call themselves fighters who liberated themselves from the occupation of the terrorist state, Israel. Similar comparisons can also be seen in the invasion carried out by the United States against the people of Iraq and the presence of United States troops in various regions of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, whose presence is perceived as a threat and factor of instability in the region.

According to Jainuri (2006), all definitions of terrorism as described above show an emphasis on the main goal rather than the tactics. Generally, terrorists try to avoid classifying their struggle tactics as criminal acts. Terrorists prefer it if their struggle is placed within the framework of a "war" against enemies to achieve political goals. Because, if the term terrorism is equated with criminal acts , then its validity as a struggle elite is increasingly reduced when compared to the use of the term "war" to describe terrorism. The tug-of-war over "labelling" terrorism, in general, is won by those who have power over the people and those who are strong over the weak. By giving the label terrorism to this second group, any actions carried out by the first party are considered legal and justified. This picture can be seen in the relationship between the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian people today. Because of the label given to the Palestinian people as extremists and terrorists, the attacks of tanks and bombs on defenseless people are considered legitimate, and the "International Community" created by the interest

groups of the Western ruling regime (the United States) in order to gain legitimacy and mobilize support for the United States' repressive military and political actions against countries that do not support the United States' global political policies and allow the ruling regime in Israel to freely terrorize the Palestinian and Arab people in general.

One neutral definition according to Wardlaw (1989), political terrorism is the use, or characterized by the use, of violence by individuals or groups, whether acting on behalf of the government or in opposition to the government, when those actions are designed to create extreme fear and/or fears of targets that are greater than the victims who are directly targeted with the aim of pressuring the targeted groups to comply with the political demands of the perpetrators.

Apart from different boundaries, there are dimensions of terrorism that have been used as a basis for limiting terrorism. *First* , the legality dimension, namely understanding terrorism as a group action carried out against the authorities. Here, terrorism is considered something illegal. Limitations like this have shortcomings, including not seeing whether the action is an "action" or a "reaction" against authorities or groups that previously carried out terrorism. *Second* , the dimension of violence, namely understanding terrorism is always associated with violence. *Third* , the goal dimension, namely understanding terrorism, is always linked to efforts to achieve goals, whether in the form of ideology, violence or other forms. However, there is also terrorism whose aim may be unclear. *Fourth* , the military dimension, namely understanding terrorism is associated with operations through military means .

Judging from the types of terrorism, there are two, namely: *First, State Terrorism* , namely the policy instrument of a ruling regime and state. In the world of politics, the term terrorism often loses its true meaning and becomes part of hurtful rhetoric between opposing politicians . A person or group at war usually accuses their political opponents of committing terror, and if the aim of this terror is successful, they do not hesitate to carry out repeated acts of terror against their opponents. As a result, "once a person is accused of being a terrorist, the accuser and others feel they have the freedom to attack and punish him with harsh and painful measures." The use of the term terrorism, as a tool of political terror, is now a widespread practice and is very unpleasant from a moral and legal point of view. *Second, Non-State Terrorism* is a form of resistance to unfair and repressive political, social and economic treatment that befalls a person or group of people (Jainuri, 1986).

In Islamic discourse, many people associate the ideology of terrorism with the doctrine of jihād, which in Christianity is equated with crusade (Khadduri, 1966). There are 35 times the word jihād is mentioned in the Qur'ān (Kassis, 1983). In Islamic tradition, jihād has various meanings. However, in general, jihād is divided into two concepts: *First*, the moral concept, defined as the struggle of Muslims against their desires or struggle against themselves (*jihād al-naḥs*), which is called *jihād al-akbar*. *Second*, the political concept, defined as the concept of "just war," *jihād al-asghar*. According to Bonney, these two concepts that coexist are always changing and developing over time. *First*, at the beginning of Islam, when Islamic territorial boundaries did not yet exist, jihād was interpreted as a concept of war. However, the meaning of jihad changed when the Islamic government was established and determined the limits of its will. In the next process, the Islamic world was recognized and in fact lived in harmony with neighboring countries that were not Muslim. Bonney emphasized that the use of the concept of jihād in early Islam to define the meaning of "war" in the modern era of Islam is anachronistic, as well as damaging the reputation of Islam (Bonney, 2004).

In classical Islamic legal theory, the war was fought between *the dar al-Islām* who defeated *the dar al-harb*. The state of war, should end together with the disappearance of *dār al-harb*. At this stage, *dār al-Islām*, which upholds peace, exercises its power in an area. Therefore, it can be emphasized that the main goal of Islam is to achieve permanent peace rather than continuing war. So in Islamic theory, jihād is a temporary legitimate tool to achieve the ideal social order according to Islam through efforts to change from *dār al-harb* to *dār al-Islām*. In practice, contact between Muslims and non-Muslims, personal and official, is carried out peacefully, although there have also been wars in other regions between Muslims and other countries. So, at the same time, the two conditions mentioned above, *dār al-Islām* and *dār al-harb*, continue to exist.

To understand the meaning of jihād, and its status in Islamic teachings, one must also look at aspects of Islamic beliefs in the historical context related to the emergence of jihād. Therefore, differences among scholars in understanding texts about jihād are understandable, including how they interpret the word jihād. Differences in several aspects of Islamic teachings have long existed and it would be very inappropriate if consensus was always seen as the only perspective in understanding Islamic teachings. The fuqahā' classified the meaning of jihād into four stages: *first*, spreading Islam in a

peaceful and non-confrontational way; *secondly* , facing the infidels with arguments; *third* , fighting infidels with certain conditions and; *fourth* , fighting the infidels unconditionally (Mutahhari, 1988).

Firestone provides another view on this theory of the evolution of jihād, and proposes a different grouping (Firestone, 1999). *The first* is a group of verses relating to non-militant ways of spreading and defending Islam, primarily addressed to *the ahl al-kitāb* . In these verses it is emphasized that the Prophet and Muslims had no role in applying punishment or waging war with opponents of Islam, such as Jews and Christians: "Our God and your God are one, and to Him alone we surrender." This principle then accumulates in the verse: "*To you is your religion and to me is my religion*," (QS al Kafirun, 109:6) which is understood as a teaching principle that accepts plurality, even though its initial intention is to provide a solution to the unbridgeable differences between Islam and belief. the Qurayish of Mecca (Sachedina, 2001; Friedmann, 2000). *The second* is a group of verses that provide limits on the battlefield: "*Fight in the way of Allāh against those who fight you, but do not exceed limits, because Allāh does not like those who exceed limits*" (QS al Baqarah, 2: 216), for example includes a prohibition on killing women, children and civilians, as well as a prohibition on fighting during certain months. *The third* is a group of verses which are considered to still be a matter of debate between God's commands and the response of Muslims and are among the largest among the other groups (al-Baqarah, 2: 216; Āli 'Imrān, 3: 156, 167-168; al-Nisā ', 4: 72-75, 77, 95; al-Tawbah, 9: 38-39, 42). *The fourth* is a group of verses that firmly command war in the way of Allah. Because of this, al-Qur'ān, al-Baqarah 2: 91 is one of the verses often cited by hardline Islamic groups to justify their attacks on non-Muslims in order to establish Islamic rule.

In general, the meaning of jihād has given rise to two important groups, both among the ulama and the common people (*al-awam*). The Mālikī madhhab scholars understand jihād in its moderate form. For the fuqahā' Imām Abū Sufyān al-Thawrī (Syria), Ibn Shibrimah (Medina), and other imāms of the Mālikī madhhab, including the founder of the madhhab himself, Imām Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), jihād was not an aspect of the main teachings (*al-asl*) which determines the nature of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. On the contrary, they understand jihād as a non-aggressive principle, such as reconciliation, peace, helping each other to achieve interests based on justice, openness, truth and religious freedom. Al-Thawri said in more detail that "fighting

idolaters is not an obligation unless they are the ones who initiate it. If that is the case, then they must be fought as commanded by Allah. If they (the infidels) fight you, kill them as well as other words and fight the infidels all if they fight you (Bonney, 2004)

For the moderate school of classical fuqahā', kāfir does not indicate an aggressive action against another. Belief is a matter of faith, which in a verse from the Madaniyah letter emphasizes that: "There is no compulsion in religion" (QS al Baqarah, 2: 285).

This verse is interpreted as having a broader meaning than simply recognizing a person's freedom to embrace their own religion. Non-Muslims living in *dār al-Islām* must be given the freedom to live and practice their religious teachings without interference from other parties, including the government. Supporters of this school generally came from the Hijāz (Mecca and Medina) ulama in the second century Hijriyah, who were basically the successors of the tradition of reforming Islamic law at the end of the first century Hijriyah in Medina, namely Sa'īd ibn al-Musayyab (d. 94/712), and his pupil and close friend 'Ata' ibn Abī Rabbah (d. 114/732). Their views on peace and war in Islam were accepted and reinterpreted by subsequent fuqahā', including Ibn Jurayh (d. 150/767), 'Amr ibn Dinar (d. 172/788), the founder of the Mālikī madhhab, Mālik ibn Anas, and other. For these fuqahā', kāfirs should not be fought because of their beliefs. Because this would conflict with the freedom to embrace religion, a universal principle that is explicitly stated in Islamic teachings. For these fuqahā', war as mentioned in the Qur'ān could only be carried out against the kāfir Arabs at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This provision does not apply to *people of the book* (Jews and Christians), Magi, and even non-Arab pagans. However, they did not mind calling for jihād against the kāfirs who were legally identified as enemies of Islam. This war against them is not only justified, but also legitimate if the kāfirs themselves were the first to start carrying out aggression and tyranny against the Muslims (QS al-Baqarah, 2:190, 193; al-Anfāl, 8: 39).

For most classical scholars, especially in the second century Hijriyah, the perception of disbelief in the Qur'an was always associated with injustice, oppression and slander. This view leads to the general assumption that all kāfirs are enemies of Islam, without further investigation as to whether they are truly advocates of injustice, oppression and slander or not. Two figures from the Hanafī madhhab, al-Shaybānī (132/749 or 750-189/805) and al-Sarakhsī (400/1010-482/1090) were important figures from the hardline group regarding jihād (Bonney, 2004). In contrast to the view above,

for radicals from the "hardline" group, the possibility of making peace with the kāfirs is an attitude that is difficult to accept. This view is based on the assumption that the order for war mentioned in the Qur'ān has totally removed the non-aggressive verses in the Qur'ān, including texts that encourage Muslims to make peace (QS al Anfāl, 8: 61). Among the important figures who support the latter opinion are some of the Basra scholars and mufassir Qatada, famous as Abū al-Khattāb (60/679-117/735), who said that Surah al-Anfāl, 8: 61 had been deleted (*mansukh*) by The verse that orders war is Surah al-Tawbah, 9: 5. Because peace or a diplomatic solution cannot be implemented, jihād becomes a strong basis for policy relations between Muslims and the non-Muslim world.

Jihād against non-Muslims is a religious and political consequence that must be implemented. Muslims remain obliged to wage unconditional war against non-Muslims until the latter embrace Islam or pay taxes, as commanded by the Qur'an, in surah al-Tawbah, 9: 29, as a sign of surrender and loyalty to Muslim governments (Jani, 1998). Al-Shāfi'ī was the first person to formulate the doctrine of jihād against infidels because of their infidelity. On this basis, jihād was then transformed into a collective obligation (*fard kifāyah*) for Muslims to fight the infidels. This legal basis gave rise to debate among followers of the al-Shāfi'ī madhhab and gave rise to differences of opinion among the Hanafī madhhab fuqahā'. Tahāwī (d 321/933), closer to the early Hanafī doctrine, said that war could be fought only if there was conflict with the kāfirs (Tahawi, 1950). However Sarakhsī, the great commentator on Shaybānī's works, accepted al-Shāfi'ī's doctrine that fighting the infidels was a permanent duty until the end of time (Sarakhsi, 1906). Some people who came later accepted this opinion and made it a normative basis for carrying out war jihad.

In fact, there are various meanings of jihad that arise from the understanding of various groups within Muslim society itself. These differences are not only related to the definition, its current existence and when the jihād was carried out, but also related to how the jihād must be carried out. Indeed, it cannot be denied that jihād is also interpreted the same as war, which in the contemporary era is carried out with terror in the form of suicide bombings. However, if we examine it further, *firstly* , jihād is an obligation to fight to do good and free ourselves from the domination of the delusions of lust. Therefore, jihād is the obligation of every individual. *Second* , if jihād is defined as physical struggle in the form of war against infidels, then the war carried out is in order to defend oneself. In this latter connection, restrictions were placed not only on the targets

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and targets of war, which were generally civilians: women, children, parents and priests, but also the time when the war was carried out. From this it is clear that war against non-Muslims cannot necessarily be carried out without clear reasons. At the very least, if the conditions such as tyranny and injustice, oppression and slander against Muslims are met, then war may be waged. It was these conditions that were then used by Imam Samudra to carry out jihād, using terror bombings, to fight oppression and eliminate evil and evil (Samudra, 2004).

In the contemporary era, both Islamic groups who have an understanding of jihād, both the "soft" and the "hard," actually have the same basic reasons that physical jihad is carried out because of causes or actions that are detrimental to Muslims. Among some hardline groups, there are those who use the excuse of going to war by ignoring the relationship between cause and effect factors. They are more based on "war verses" (QS al-Baqarah, 2: 190; al-Tawbah, 9: 39, 123; al-Zumār, 39: 79), literally, which are considered normatively to have power. The law is compared with the same verses that came first, which in the tradition of understanding Islamic teachings are called *naskh-mansukh*. Some Muslims criticize this way of understanding and state that it is Allah who has the right to abolish and enforce His will. Even though in the Qur'an itself there are references explaining changes (QS al-Baqarah, 2: 106; al Nahl: 101), or the replacement of revelation by another revelation, the Qur'an itself does not explain the theory of *naskh*. If the meaning of the text in general is to abolish the original teachings or rules, while the original words are still written in the mushaf, and in fact both groups of texts are still in the Qur'ān, then this situation is confusing for certain groups. This confusion gave birth to another understanding of *naskh theory*. Those who have this understanding state that the *naskh* is basically a logical process and is necessary to practice the text of the Qur'an appropriately, due to conditions, and postpone the practice of other texts until environmental conditions allow it to be implemented (Naim, 1990). So, regarding the verses that are the source of the ideology of jihād, which as discussed above, all remain valid, the practice of which depends on the conditions and conditions that require it. The interpretation of jihād as carried out by some hardline groups in the Muslim community is also a common tendency among Western orientalists in linking terrorism with the concept of jihād. The latter trap themselves in understanding the concept of jihād, which is only based on limited subjective abilities and interests. So in fact, Muslim hardliners and Western orientalists have the same understanding of jihād. They understand it

literally and only take one meaning from the many interpretations of jihād. This kind of understanding is very contrary to their own scientific tradition, which upholds breadth of views and a spirit of plurality in understanding things. Among these are Pipe and Mac Arthur who interpret jihād as the same as fighting non-Muslims (Pipe, 2001). This tendency of understanding used to be one of the prominent characteristics of Orientalists in understanding Islam (Southern, 1962). This lack of accurate understanding of Islam and Muslim society has been used as a basis for the ruling regimes of Western countries in establishing their relations with the Muslim world. As a result, West-East relations over a very long period were marked by conflict and mutual suspicion (Daniel, 1960). This fact awakened several groups of Western academics who criticized the imbalance in this relationship and tried to straighten out Western understanding of Islam and Muslim society proportionally and objectively (Said, 1979). Even though they are a small group, their influence continues to grow and develop, especially in the university environment .

The factors behind Indonesia becoming a fertile land or "paradise", as a source of recruitment for terrorist groups

The understanding of jihād as a normative basis for physical struggle is fostered by the social, political, economic, cultural and religious conditions of Muslim communities in areas of the country with a majority Muslim population. The normative aspect of jihād teachings is the main basis for creating justice, eliminating oppression and slander. Likewise, all the problems faced by Muslims in the contemporary era are important elements in formulating a new ideology. As an ideology, terrorism has the function of overcoming the three problems above faced by Muslims. According to Jainuri, the emergence of the terrorist movement is a symptom of awakening in fighting injustice, oppression and slander carried out by some local and global communities against other parts of society. However, the problem that arises remains the question, why was terrorism chosen? The key to understanding terrorism actually lies in careful research into the history of terrorism and its relationship to certain contemporary conditions that gave rise to terrorism. Therefore, the reasons why terrorism emerged is the most important aspect to understand. The doctrine of jihād and the conditions of problems in the field appear to be important motivations and factors that inspire terror perpetrators, who often demonstrate their willingness to separate themselves from wider society and their courage to carry out suicide bombings.

In essence, all terror movements are a natural consequence of a process of humanitarian and cultural change. In every society in the world, change takes place in various forms and stages. Some members of society accept the changes happily, and some react violently. When people feel forced to accept change, some of them feel the need to reject it, sometimes with violence. Therefore, the dynamics of terrorism are closely related to the dynamics within and outside the group. When a group feels that it has territorial rights and power that are simply usurped by others, then what becomes the target of criticism is its own internal weaknesses and strong external forces. Apart from ideological motivation as mentioned above, there are two important factors that have contributed to the emergence of terrorism: *First*, the weak power of Muslims, which according to radical leaders, is due to the moral decline of the Muslim ruling elite. Radicalists accuse the Muslim ruling elite of being puppets of Western countries, not only because of the secular government system they implement, but also because their government policies are considered to benefit the West more than the people themselves. The people do not have any power and do not have the ability to solve their own problems, therefore making it easier for outsiders to pressure and oppress them. This condition encourages the emergence of physical and mental training programs to shape and strengthen personal character and facilitate anyone who wants to become a martyr to uphold the ideal society. *Second*, the radicalists' objective recognition of the non-Muslim world as having reached the peak of progress, both in the fields of science, economics and political stability. However, their progress was used to exploit other nations in the world, giving rise to disharmonious relations between the East (Islam) and the West for a long period of time. From the era of colonialism to post-colonialism, relations were more directed towards fulfilling Western interests (Beeman, 2001).

The two factors mentioned above are a general phenomenon which can be briefly seen in three important aspects causing the emergence of acts of terrorism in the Muslim world. *First*, political reasons are dominated by the prolonged Israeli-Arab conflict and United States political and military interference in Muslim countries. *Second*, cultural reasons, namely resistance to Western cultural colonialism; and *third*, social causes due to poverty and alienation (Bar, 2004). While none of the political figures in the West reject the war on terrorism, at the same time, politically they also confirm that the "disappointment and ill feelings of the Muslim community," due to unfair treatment in

the three aspects mentioned above, are the rational reasons that provide legitimacy of demands for acts of terrorism.

The political motives of some mujāhidīn leaders in fighting the West are beyond doubt. However, the moral justification and core of the strength of the mujahideen movement against injustice is the spirit of Islamic jihād teachings. By using the basis of religion and instilling the principles of resistance in Islam into every Muslim's soul, the figures of the Islamic radical movement succeeded in motivating some of the mujahideen to carry out resistance with suicide bombings, making them aware of the social conditions that permitted their actions and the understanding of religion that provided a moral and ethical foundation. law for their actions. Their success in recruiting, positioning themselves, and maintaining the ideology of activists (mainly the perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks) without being detected by Western security sophistication is the nature of work that underlies this phenomenon.

The siding of world political institutions with Western interests in resolving conflicts between nations has not only caused the Israeli-Arab conflict to protract, but also to the increasing number of areas of conflict in the Islamic region. The world map is no longer only divided into developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor, but also *equilibrium* and *disequilibrium* . Countries in the Islamic region generally belong to parts of the world that are *in disequilibrium* . The hope of resolving the problem is not only hampered by the weakness of the world political body and the interests of certain countries which want the condition of the Islamic world to remain *status-quo* , but also by the egoistic attitude of the members of the Muslim community themselves. The phenomenon of conflict between fellow citizens and ummah caused by momentary interests and needs not only weakens the nation's potential but also facilitates the process of intervention by external powers (*superpower*). From here emerged a scattering of *local agents* who were more profitable for outside powers. This phenomenon is reflected in individual Muslims and on a broader scale can be seen in the increasingly weakening solidarity among Islamic countries (OIC), especially Arab countries. The latter was unable to exploit the potential wealth it possessed, as it had done in the 1970s, which appropriately responded to the challenge by embargoing oil shipments to the West. The inability to renounce the political exploitation of external powers and the increasingly widespread military intervention of Israel into Palestine and Lebanon and the United

States into Iraq, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, are the dominant factors causing the proliferation of radicalism in the name of religion.

The second factor is cultural causes. Although this factor does not directly influence the formation of radicalism in Islam, it has a big role in forming anti-Western sentiment among some Muslims. This feeling stems from one's inability to maintain noble cultural values in the face of modern, materialistic Western culture. Islamic ethical values, which have been the basis for interaction between fellow believers, are starting to be displaced by Western culture, which is expanding through print and electronic media networks. The influence of Western culture in the lives of most Muslims can be seen starting from the consumption of food and drink products, the way they dress, socializing to the practice of religious rites which are more prominent in the *entertainment packaging* than in the meaning of worship. Personal disgrace becomes a "natural" spectacle and becomes a business commodity that brings in a lot of money. The presentation of violent, erotic and seductive scenes in electronic media broadcasts has become a routine program that must be watched by people of all ages. This cultural influence is very popular among third world people, including Muslims, and has become their new identity. This influence is known in *the theory of cocacolonisation*, which is the source of the emergence of new world conflicts (Huntington, 2000).

Therefore, as Caufield said, what needs to be emphasized in relation to colonialist-imperialist exploitation is not that one social class dominates another social class, but rather that one culture over another culture (Caufield, 1969). The rulers in Muslim countries feel inferior not because of their economic strength, which is actually higher, but because of what they think is the ideal that must be had and is also a symbol of progress, namely consumerist culture, pop culture and morals that permissive. The basis of the argument which can be strongly understood is that the rise of Islamic radical movement activists in the Islamic region actually has little to do with economic exploitation, whether it is related to the exploitation of natural resources or energy, but rather with cultural degradation and desiccation (Snow and Marshall, 1984). It was this cultural tendency that Imam Khomeini criticized the Shah of Iran's policy of promoting a culture of consumerism. In Imam Khomeini's eyes, the Iranian people (at that time) were competing to seek material satisfaction. Cars have become a symbol of luxury and those who already have cars and houses want nicer and bigger ones. Iranian Muslims have forgotten their religious values. Simplicity, gentleness, self-integrity, friendliness and

honesty towards others are replaced by a spirit of greed and all means are justified. All this must be changed, and revolution is the beginning of this change (Ibrahim, 1979). Although what Imam Khomeini said may be an exaggeration, in fact feelings of anti-Western culture can be found in many countries with a majority Muslim population.

The third factor, which is a result of the first and second factors, is poverty and alliances. If Marx uses his analysis framework, analysis includes two things: analysis of currently developing values and norms, as mentioned in the second factor. The religious values and ethics held by radical groups have so far become *meaningless*. In this context, what they have is true, and they see themselves as not part of *the mainstream* of the people in general, but as a group of guardians of the truth. Second is the allusion to participation or *powerlessness*. Radical groups feel that Muslims are a group that is marginalized in dealing with global problems related to the Islamic world. The disaster that befell the Islamic world, according to them, was the result of unfair political treatment and the imposition of the interests of Western countries assisted by their local agents who generally occupied secular government positions in most of the Muslim-populated areas. Clearly the reason for the resistance to the West is due to the refusal of political participation by Muslims to solve their own problems, even through a democratic system. If their political participation is blocked, they find their own way out. The solution could be religious radicalism or other forms of violence, such as terrorism. The cases of FIS (Algeria) and HAMAS (Palestine), who won elections that were annulled and not recognized by the "international community," the United States' support for repressive regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria and Jordan, as well as a series of political problems that befell the Muslims in several regions, such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, and others are interesting examples to point out.

Conditions like those mentioned above are the causes that encourage the emergence of acts of terror, which have an impact on: *First*, the emergence of an attitude of frustration among some Muslims, as represented by radical groups. This frustrated attitude ultimately drives oneself to become exclusive in society, reactionary in dealing with problems, and tends to resort to violence in solving problems. *Second*, failure to mobilize the masses to support violent actions. This failure may also be due to their exclusivity in wider public life. *Third*, there is no other choice. In this regard, the terrorists consider themselves to be a weak group. Because military power is lacking, diplomacy is always castrated by international and local political institutions, the only

way that must be taken to fight injustice, oppression and slander is through suicide bombings and other acts of terror. Therefore, it is true what Martha Greshaw said that terrorism does not always have to be understood as a deviant act. It is possible that terror is a rational and mature response to the existing situation (Jainuri, 2006).

Thus the conclusion that can be presented is as follows: The aim of acts of terrorism is to declare war against three aspects, namely injustice, oppression and slander (Jainuri, 2002). In this context, the war was aimed at the West, namely the United States (US). The siding of world political institutions with the West is the main trigger, such as: disarmament by the US in Palestine, even the US allowing Israel to increase its stock of weapons. The US double standard then disappointed a group of Muslims, including its political elite. Radicals then accused the Muslim ruling elite of being puppets of the West. In the contemporary era, the relationship between West and East, in this case Islam, is indeed not harmonious. The alternative of jihād then emerged. For radicals, fighting the infidels (West) is a religious and political consequence that must be implemented. They are frustrated people. Because they lose in physical abilities and are always at a disadvantage in dialogue. Rather than live oppressed and slandered, they would rather die as "patriots". These are the thoughts in the minds of suicide bombers and the attitude they must take. In carrying out their actions as "patriots", the terrorists created physical and mental training programs to shape and strengthen their character. They also facilitate anyone who wants to become a "martyr" to uphold the society they aspire to.

3. CLOSING

The background to Indonesia becoming a fertile land or "paradise", both as a source of group recruitment and action is: *First*, the factor of the Islamic religion which is embraced by the majority of the Indonesian people. *Second*, geographical factors are very influential. The vast territory and expanse of Indonesia's islands greatly increases the risk of acts of terrorism. Because their mobility will be very difficult to detect. Apart from that, various US facilities located in Indonesia are targets. And also the limited capabilities of the security forces. *Third*, the very worrying socio-economic factors of the bomber were the main cause. The bottom line is poverty and alienation. According to them, it is better to seek heaven than to live in poverty and always be lured by beautiful *rewards after death*. *Fourth*, the charisma factor of the figure who spreads the doctrine is influential. For example, Dr. Azhari or Noordin Moh. Top, his followers in Indonesia

were very amazed by the greatness of these two figures. Especially, how they are willing to leave all kinds of worldly pleasures that they have to fight for jihad. *Fifth*, a person's educational level influences their understanding of Islam. Interpretation is also carried out by terrorist groups, but they only translate holy verses in black and white. Jihād is no longer defined as fighting against oneself (lusts), but killing and destroying everything related to the West. They also do not feel guilty by sacrificing non-US people in the bomb attack, because it is different from human rights. This means that bomb victims are intermediaries to convey messages to the desired parties.

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